Parliamentarians' Evaluations of the Global Economic Crisis by Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula
www.ssoar.info
Parliamentarians' Evaluations of the Global
Economic Crisis
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2018). Parliamentarians' Evaluations of the Global Economic Crisis. Historical Social Research,
43(4), 175-202. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.43.2018.4.175-202
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Historical Social Research 43 (2018) 4, 175-202 │ published by GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.43.2018.4.175-202 
Parliamentarians' Evaluations of  
the Global Economic Crisis 
Ursula Hoffmann-Lange ∗ 
Abstract: »Einschätzungen der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise durch Parlamen-
tarier«. Based on two surveys of parliamentarians in five new (Chile, South Ko-
rea, Poland, South Africa, Turkey) and two established (Germany, Sweden) de-
mocracies, the paper analyzes perceptions of the global economic crisis as well 
as evaluations of policies to fight the crisis and their determinants. In a second 
step, it will be determined if these perceptions and evaluations are related to 
participation in government and to the ideological positions of the political 
parties. Finally, it will be asked if a decline in democratic legitimacy in the po-
litical orientations of MPs and citizens can be observed in the wake of the cri-
sis. 
Keywords: Economic perceptions, Great Recession, government participation, 
party ideology, confidence in political institutions, support for democracy, po-
litical legitimacy. 
1.  Introduction 
Concerns about the damaging effects of a deep economic crisis on the viability 
of democracy are particularly pertinent in the light of the European experience 
during the Great Depression of the early 1930s when democracy collapsed in 
several European countries and was replaced by authoritarian or totalitarian 
regimes. It is therefore not surprising that the global economic and financial 
crisis that started in 2008, the Great Recession, has revived those memories, 
especially since some of the repercussions of the current crisis are similar: 
Rising levels of unemployment, widespread public protests, increasing voter 
volatility, dwindling support for traditional parties and a rise of populist ones. 
The comparative analysis of democratic stability and breakdown in interwar 
Europe by Berg-Schlosser and colleagues (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 2002) 
confirms these similarities. 
After the crash of the stock-market on October 4, 1929, in New York, “per 
capita income declined, industrial production fell and unemployment rose 
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sharply” (Berg-Schlosser 1998, 351). “The sober economic figures […] meant 
severe suffering and outright misery for families and individuals affected by 
the crisis” (ibid., 352). Even though there is no hard empirical evidence from 
public opinion surveys for that time, historical studies indicate the existence of 
widespread political dissatisfaction. The number of violent demonstrations 
increased dramatically, while electoral data show a rise of protest parties and a 
high degree of voter volatility (for Germany Lepsius 1978; Berg-Schlosser 1998, 
355). 
However, although all 15 European democracies included in Berg-
Schlosser’s study suffered from economic distress and political conflicts, de-
mocracy survived in eight of the 15. The analysis identified seven explanatory 
factors that were responsible for the survival or breakdown of democracy: 
Historical background, the impact of the post-World War I crisis, the effects of 
the intermediate period 1924-1928, the economic impact of the Great Depres-
sion 1929-1934, the social and electoral reactions after 1929 as well as the 
behavior of individual political actors at critical turning points. Among the 
survivor cases, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom stand out as 
longstanding stable democracies where the economic crisis did not produce any 
serious destabilization of democracy. Albeit an at the time recent democracy in 
a rather poor country, Ireland was not much affected by the economic crisis and 
also had a staunchly prodemocratic prime minister who was able to hold anti-
democratic movements at bay. Belgium and France both experienced a rise of 
sizeable antidemocratic political movements, which were not strong enough, 
however, to endanger the survival of democracy. In Czechoslovakia and Fin-
land the situation was even more critical, but democracy was saved through 
vigorous prodemocratic interventions by their presidents. Democracy broke 
down in the other seven democracies.1 Hungary is the only one of them in 
which the economic crisis did not contribute to the breakdown. Germany was 
the most notable breakdown case where the soaring unemployment following 
the economic shock of 1929 enabled Hitler’s ascent to power in January 1933. 
Likewise, the social and electoral reactions to the Great Depression played a 
role in the democratic breakdowns of Austria, Estonia, Greece, Romania, and 
Spain (Berg-Schlosser 2012, 54). 
The situation in today’s democracies differs in many important respects, 
however. First, and most important, the Great Recession was much less severe 
and could be overcome must faster than the Great Depression. This was pri-
marily due to the fact that the available economic policy tools for dealing with 
economic crises have become more elaborate. Moreover, since World War II 
global institutions have been created that allow for swift international responses 
to such crises. Most democracies also have established welfare policies that 
                                                             
1  Three countries in which the democracy broke down already before the beginning of the 
Great Depression, Italy in 1922, Poland and Portugal in 1926, were not included in the study. 
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contribute to alleviating the economic hardships associated with unemploy-
ment, inflation, or other crisis-related consequences for the livelihood of the 
less well-to-do. Additionally, support for democracy is more deeply rooted in 
the political culture of most European democracies than it was in the 1930s. 
Last but not least, most of today’s political elites are convinced that democratic 
institutions are the only acceptable way of governing. These factors have not 
only contributed to easing the economic downturn associated with the recession 
and bringing most European countries quickly back onto the path of economic 
recovery, but also have prevented economic dissatisfaction from evolving into 
anti-democratic mass protests. However, the political risks associated with a 
continued economic downturn are far from over yet. This is particularly true 
for Greece,2 but also for some other major countries around the globe (e.g., 
Brazil and Russia). Moreover, the current refugee crisis adds to the concerns of 
citizens about the impact of the rapid social and economic changes on their 
societies and their personal well-being. 
Elites are crucial actors both for democratic transition and for the consolida-
tion of new democracies (Higley and Burton 2006). The survival of democracy 
in the interwar period confirmed that the stability of democracy during eco-
nomic and international crises involved a mixture of favorable socio-economic 
conditions, a supportive political culture, and accommodative elite behavior. 
The following analysis will focus primarily on the latter aspect. It will analyze 
the economic perceptions and democratic value orientations of members of 
parliament (MPs) in five young and two established democracies3 to find out 
whether the economic and financial crisis has produced conflicting elite per-
ceptions of its causes and its impact. It will start out by studying the assess-
ments of how the recession has influenced the economic situation of their coun-
try, how they perceive the effectiveness of their country’s government in 
coping with the crisis, their own and their party’s positions on economic policy 
issues as well as other political orientations. Next, the relationships between 
these perceptions, evaluations, and policy preferences will be analyzed to de-
termine the factors that influence them: Objective facts, membership in govern-
ing vs. opposition parties, or party ideology. Finally, it will be asked whether 
                                                             
2  A recent report published by the World Bank shows that the recession is still ongoing in a 
number of countries. The report warns for instance that the economic and financial stress in 
Greece “presents a risk to the regional outlook.” It also mentions the risk that spillovers 
from the European periphery could raise sovereign and corporate risk premiums and force 
countries to tighten fiscal policy even further. “Persistently high unemployment and anemic 
investment could undermine potential longer-term growth” (2015, 38-9). 
3  The five new democracies (re)democratized around 1990 while the consolidation of democ-
racy in Sweden and Germany was achieved much earlier. Background information on the 
project and the survey data used for analysis are provided in Klingemann and Hoffmann-
Lange in this issue. 
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the crisis has had an impact on the legitimacy of democracy among MPs and 
citizens of these countries. 
The analysis is primarily based on data of a comparative survey of parlia-
mentarians in the seven democracies, conducted in 2013 (CMP 2013).4 The 
advantage of the data is that many of the MPs’ political orientations can be 
compared to the results of a previous MP survey conducted in 2007, before the 
onset of the crisis. The changes between 2007 and 2013 can show if the crisis 
has had substantial effects on these orientations. 
Finally, the political orientations of the MPs can also be compared to the re-
sults of the 5th and 6th waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), thus allow-
ing additional comparisons of the changes in the political orientations of MPs 
and voters. The changes between the years before the onset of the crisis and the 
data collected between 2010 and 2013 do not allow a direct assessment whether 
changes in political orientations can be considered as being caused by the eco-
nomic crisis, however, because the earlier surveys included only a few ques-
tions on economic policy attitudes. Nevertheless, they shed light on changes in 
politically relevant value orientations and support for democracy over the last 
decade. Therefore, they can show if consensus on democratic values has de-
clined. They also provide information on the degree of polarization between the 
party-political camps and if it has increased since 2007.5 
2.  Economic Perceptions of MPs in 2013 
The questionnaire included four items asking for the respondents’ evaluations 
of the present economic situation in their country and their expectations for its 
future economic prospects. Another five items dealt with the perceived impact 
the crisis had on the country in general, the economy, the banking system, the 
standard of living, and democracy. A principal components analysis of these 
perceptions was performed to determine if they could be combined into one or 
two indices. The analysis revealed a two-dimensional structure confirming that 
the perceptions of the economic situation and those regarding the impact of the 
crisis loaded on two statistically independent factors. Only the item asking for 
the perceived impact of the crisis on the country’s democracy showed very low 
correlations with the other impact items and was therefore excluded from fur-
                                                             
4  The data are part of a larger comparative study of democracy in these countries, which is 
described in Klingemann and Hoffmann-Lange (2018, in this issue). Information on the sur-
veys, including the numbers of respondents, is provided there and will not be repeated here. 
5  In order to make scores comparable for scales using different ranges (e.g., 1-10 or 1-4), all 
scores were rescaled to a range from 0 to 1. This allows a more intuitive interpretation of 
the means. 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  179 
ther analysis.6 Without this item, the two factors accounted for nearly 73% of 
the total variance (34.9% plus 37.7%). The reliability coefficient for the two 
sets of items was rather high with a Cronbach’s α of .84 for the economic situa-
tion and α = .89 for the impact of the crisis. Separate analyses for the seven 
countries confirmed the overall pattern. Only one of the country-specific relia-
bility coefficients was slightly below α = .70. Based on these results, two indi-
ces were constructed and will be used for the analysis.7 
Figure 1:  MPs' Perceptions of the Economic Situation and of the Impact of the 
Economic Crisis in their Country  
 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. Mean index scores, range 0-1. 
 
Figure 1 provides a first impression regarding the MPs’ economic perceptions. 
The scores for both indices vary considerably across the seven countries and do 
not show any uniform pattern. However, at the aggregate level there is an obvi-
ous connection between the evaluations of the current economic situation in the 
MPs’ countries and the perceptions of the impact of the crisis. The three coun-
                                                             
6  This confirms that democracy is perceived as not directly influenced by economic factors. 
7  Unless otherwise indicated all indices are mean scores of the variables included in the index. 
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tries that received the highest ratings for the current economic situation (Chile, 
Germany, and Turkey), also have the lowest averages for the perceived impact 
of the crisis. 
Table 1: Economic Indicators and Perceptions of MPs in 2013  
 Chile Germany Korea Poland 
South 
Africa Sweden Turkey 
GDP p.c. 2007 in US $ 10,379 42,761 23,101 11,252 5,851 53,325 9,312 
GDP p.c. 2013 in US $ 15,732 46,269 25,977 13,648 6,618 60,430 10,972 
Rank among the 7 
countries 4 2 3 5 7 1 6 
Rank among 187 
independent coun-
tries1 
44 20 32 55 74 8 62 
Growth impact of 
recession2 2.03 1.76 2.22 0.55 2.58 3.06 3.57 
Rank among the 7 
countries 5 6 4 7 3 2 1 
Rank among 187 
independent coun-
tries1 
84 93 82 123 69 57 48 
Perception of the 
current economic 
situation of the 
country (range 0-1) 
.71 .73 .38 .43 .51 .56 .59 
Rank among the 7 
countries 
2 1 7 6 5 4 3 
Perception of the 
impact of the reces-
sion on the country 
(range 0-1) 
.38 .47 .70 .64 .55 .60 .44 
Rank among the 7 
countries 
7 5 1 2 4 3 6 
Source: World Bank economic indicators and CMP survey 2013. 
1 187 independent countries for which economic data are available. 
2 Average growth 2000-2007 minus average growth 2008-2010. 
 
Table 1 provides macro data by the World Bank on GDP per capita and the 
growth impact of the recession in the seven countries that allow to compare 
how well the subjective perceptions match the objective data.8 It shows that the 
perceptions of the MPs and the economic facts are more or less unrelated. 
While South Korea (henceforth simply denominated as Korea) is the third-
                                                             
8  The economic data were compiled by Du Plessis, Freytag and Boshoff (2015) who also 
developed several measures to determine the sequence and the impact of the recession. The 
growth impact of the recession was measured by deducting the average GDP growth rate 
2008-2010 from the average GDP growth 2000-2007. 
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richest country in our group, the Korean MP’s evaluations of the current Kore-
an economy is the lowest. Likewise, the scores of the Swedish MPs for the 
economic situation in their country are lower than those of their counterparts in 
Chile and Turkey, although Sweden is the eight-richest country in the world 
and the richest among the seven countries in our study. 
The same is true for the perceived impact of the crisis. Although Poland was 
hardly hit by the crisis,9 Polish MPs perceived the crisis as a great setback for 
the country, while Turkish MPs were less pessimistic about the impact of the 
crisis. At the same time, Turkey was the country most affected by the crisis 
among our seven countries. 
These results confirm that political perceptions are not only influenced by 
facts, but that they also reflect the situation in relevant reference countries, 
information by the media, other sources of information and last but not least 
‘wishful thinking’ (Dolan and Holbrook 2001; Bartels 2002; Mutz 1992). 
Likewise, analyses of the influence of economic perceptions on voting have 
shown such perceptions to be strongly influenced by preexisting ideological 
orientations and the party preference of the voters (Evans and Pickup 2010; 
Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs 1997). Therefore, one should not expect that the 
MPs base their ratings on a global comparison of economic well-being, but 
rather by comparing the situation in their own country with that in neighboring 
or economically similar countries, with the past performance of the economy 
and their personal expectations. 
Table 2 includes information on the relationships among the different eco-
nomic perceptions. As was mentioned before, the perceptions of the economic 
situation and the perceptions of the impact of the crisis loaded on two inde-
pendent factors. This implies that they were not related to each other. The low 
correlation coefficients in five of the seven countries confirm this expectation. 
However, the very high negative correlation coefficient for Turkey and the 
fairly high coefficient for Korea show that respondents who evaluated the 
economic situation more positively were at the same time inclined to perceive a 
smaller impact on the economy in their country. 
A number of additional questions allow to determine the degree to which the 
perceptions of the economic situation of one’s country are related to other 
economic perceptions. Neoliberal economic policies are frequently blamed for 
having been responsible for the crisis. Likewise, the increase in economic 
inequality is assumed to be a result of the crisis. The latter assumption is based 
on the fact that a large number of financial institutions – primarily failing in-
vestment banks and insurance companies – had to be bailed out with taxpayers’ 
money. This strained public budgets and required governments to introduce 
austerity policies that involved tax hikes and cut-backs in welfare programs. 
                                                             
9  The impact of the recession was only .55 in Poland which was the lowest in our seven 
countries. 
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Such policies have fueled protest movements directed against neoliberalism 
and the irresponsible actions of financial institutions as well as demands for the 
introduction of government programs to ease economic hardships and to stimu-
late the economy. 
Table 2: Correlations among Economic Perceptions1 (Pearson’s r) 
Perception of the current 
economic situation of the 
country and perception of  
... 
Economic impact 
of crisis 
Neoliberalism 
responsible for the 
crisis 
Income  
differences have 
increased 
Chile .17 -.30 -.25 
Germany -.26 -.35 -.33 
Korea -.36 -.08 -.22 
Poland .06 -.36 -.46 
South Africa -.17 .34 -.04 
Sweden -.18 -.46 -.34 
Turkey -.66 -.46 -.71 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. 
1 Perceptions of the current economic situation of the country (‘very bad’ to ‘very good’), of 
the impact of the crisis on the country (‘no negative impact’ to ‘severe negative impact’), and 
perception that the crisis was a consequence of neo-liberal economic policies (‘did not play 
any role’ to ‘were primarily responsible’) were measured on a 10-point scale. Perception of 
income differences due to the crisis was measured on a 3-point scale (‘remained the same,’ 
‘somewhat larger than before,’ ‘much larger than before’). 
 
The correlation coefficients for the perception that neoliberalism was responsi-
ble for the crisis indicate an inverse, albeit only weak relationship with the 
evaluation of the economic situation in the country. The better the evaluation of 
the economy, the less MPs tend to blame the crisis on neoliberalism. Likewise, 
the perception that income differences have increased is negatively related to 
the perception that the economy is doing well in six of the seven countries, 
with the exception of South Africa (r = -.04). The correlation coefficients in the 
other countries vary between a low r = -.22 in Korea and a high  
r = -.71 in Turkey. The results show that both assumptions are not universally 
shared by the MPs in our seven countries. 
3. Participation in Government and Party Ideology as 
Explanatory Factors 
It can be expected that parliamentarians whose party participates in the sitting 
government hold more favorable perceptions of the economic situation than 
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parliamentarians belonging to opposition parties. This is a matter of cognitive 
consonance because otherwise they would have to concede their own party’s 
inability in handling economic policy. They also need to assure citizens that 
things are not so bad as long as they remain in charge of the government. At 
the same time, MPs of center-left parties can be assumed to hold more pessi-
mistic perceptions of the economic situation because these parties tend to be 
more critical of capitalism and free markets.10 This should be even more pro-
nounced after an economic recession that has depleted public budgets due to 
costly bail-out measures for saving failing financial institutions. Therefore, 
participation in government of the MP’s party and the ideological position of 
the MPs’ party are the two main factors that can be expected to explain the 
economic perceptions of the MPs. Table 3 provides the correlation coefficients 
for both explanatory factors. Government participation is a straightforward 
dummy variable based on factual information,11 while the ideological position 
of the political parties in the seven countries is based on the parliamentarians’ 
average ratings of the position of their party on a 10-point left-right scale.12 
Table 3 confirms that government participation has the expected effect in all 
seven countries. However, the correlations coefficients vary considerably and 
range from r = .51 in Germany to r = .89 in Turkey. Figure 2 illustrates this 
effect. MPs belonging to the governing parties indeed provided more favorable 
ratings of the economic situation of their country than those of the opposition 
parties. They obviously tended to evaluate the actual economic situation on the 
                                                             
10  Despite its short-comings, the traditional economic left-right dimension will be used for 
analysis. While it is obvious that multi-party systems usually represent several conflict di-
mensions, the economic conflict dimension is still the most important one and the simple 
left-right scale used in surveys reflects this dimension rather well. 
11 For Germany, MPs of the coalition by Christian Democrats and Free Democrats from October 
2009 and December 2013 were classified as belonging to the governing parties, while MPs 
belonging to the Social Democratic, the Green, and the Left party were classified as opposi-
tion. It should be noted that a change in government to a grand coalition of Christian Dem-
ocrats and Social Democrats took place in Germany on December 17, 2013, while the field 
work for the survey was still going on. Only a few interviews were conducted after that 
date, however, and statistical controls showed that including these respondents in the analysis 
had no influence on the results. 
12  Respondents were asked to rate their own ideological position, the ideological position of 
their party as well as that of the voters of their party on a 10-point left-right scale. The 
party ideology variable was constructed from the second of these scores for all parties that 
had been rated by at least five MPs. Only three very small leftist Chilean parties could not 
be classified because less than five MPs of these parties were represented in the Chilean 
sample. Another 12 respondents were independent deputies, five in Chile and seven in Po-
land. They could not be classified either.  
The decision for party ideology rather than personal ideological orientation was based on 
the assumption that the parliamentary party is an important reference group for MPs and 
ensures a high rate of internal information exchange about economic perceptions. Both 
variables are closely intercorrelated (r = .85). 
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basis of what the government could achieve under adverse global conditions, 
while the opposition parties tended to demand more. The government-
opposition difference is particularly pronounced in Poland, South Africa, and 
Turkey. 
Table 3:  Correlations among Government Participation,1 Party Ideology,2 and 
Perceptions of the Current Economic Situation in the Country3 
(Pearson’s r) 
 
 
Perception of the Economic Situation of the Country and ... 
Government Participation Party Ideology 
Chile .74 .71 
Germany .51 .54 
Korea .57 .57 
Poland .74 -.29 
South Africa .69 -.27 
Sweden .64 .61 
Turkey .89 .72 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. 
1 0=opposition, 1=government. 
2 Based on MPs’ ratings of the ideological position of their party on a 10-point left-right scale. 
3 Index perception of the economic situation measured on a 10-point scale from very bad to 
very good. 
 
The correlation between party ideology and the evaluation of the economic 
situation is only a modest r = .23 instead. Table 3 shows the expected effect for 
five countries, while Poland as well as South Africa are deviating cases where 
the sign of the correlation coefficient is reversed. This is due to the fact that the 
MPs of the main right-of-center party (the PiS and the DA) that were in the 
opposition evaluated the economic situation more pessimistically. This con-
firms that participation in government is definitely the more important explana-
tory factor. The South African case also indicates that the two explanatory 
variables can create a cross-pressure situation for leftist parties in government 
(the ANC in South Africa) and rightist opposition parties.13 The Polish case is 
more complicated since Poland does not have a strong party of the left. Both 
                                                             
13  The differences in the means between government and opposition parties as well as be-
tween left-of-center and right-of-center parties are much smaller for the perceptions of 
the impact of the crisis which seem to be based primarily on idiosyncratic rather than sys-
tematic factors. 
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the PO and the PiS are centrist parties with respect to their positions on eco-
nomic policies. 
Figure 2:  MPs' Perceptions of the Economic Situation in Their Country by 
Government vs. Opposition Parties 
 
Source: CMP 2013 Survey. Mean index scores, range 0-1. 
 
To determine the relative influence of government participation and party ide-
ology on the evaluations of the economic situation, a multivariate analysis is 
required. This is impossible for three of our seven countries, however, because 
of the near perfect intercorrelation of the government-opposition and the party 
ideology variables in these countries. In 2013, Chile, Germany, and Korea were 
governed by center-right parties, while the leftist parties were in the opposition. 
Therefore, it is impossible to determine the relative importance of the two 
predictors in these three countries. 
In the four other countries, the opposition was split in 2013. In Sweden, the 
government was made up of four center-right parties (Moderates, Liberals, 
Christian Democrats, and the Center Party), while three center-left parties 
(Social Democrats, the Left Party, and the Greens) as well as the right-wing 
Sweden Democrats constituted the opposition. The figures in Table 3 confirm 
that government participation is a slightly stronger predictor of economic per-
ceptions than party ideology (r = .64 vs. r = .61), primarily because the evalua-
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tions of the Sweden Democrats were as low as those of the other opposition 
parties. 
In Poland, a center-right government made up of the market liberal PO and 
the centrist agrarian PSL was in power, while the opposition was made up of 
the nationalist PiS as well as the conservative Solidarna Polska and two center-
left parties (the social democratic SLD and the left liberal Ruch Palikota). The 
ratings by the PiS parliamentarians were even more negative than those by the 
leftist opposition parties. 
The AKP government in Turkey faced an opposition made up of the leftist 
CHP, the Kurdish BDP as well as the nationalist MHP. The government-
opposition divide has a much stronger influence than the left-right dimension, 
too, and the ratings of the economic situation by the MPs of both the leftist 
CHP and the rightist MHP were equally low. 
Table 4: Economic Perceptions of South African MPs by Party 
  
African 
National 
Congress 
(ANC) 
Demo-
cratic 
Alliance 
(DA) 
Inkatha 
Freedom 
Party 
Congress 
of the 
People 
(COPE) 
Total1 
Current economic 
situation of the 
country (0-1) 
Mean .65 .33 .43 .34 .56 
Neoliberalism 
responsible for 
crisis (0-1) 
Mean .71 .47 .62 .51 .65 
Impact of crisis 
has reached its 
peak 
% 80.7 53.8 33.3 42.9 71.1 
Income distribu-
tion is unfair % 61.9 84.3 85.7 85.8 68.6 
Income differences 
have become 
much larger 
% 34.5 36.2 42.9 42.9 35.6 
Left-right score of 
party Mean 4.5 5.1 5.0 3.7 4.6 
Number of Re-
spondents 
n 63 58 7 14 142 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. 
1 Weighted for the parliamentary strength of the different parties. 
 
In South Africa, finally, the leftist ANC governed alone, while the opposition 
included the liberal DA, the ethnic Inkatha Freedom Party, and COPE, a split-
off from the ANC. Here, the correlation coefficient between party ideology and 
perception of the economic situation is even reversed with r = -.27. The figures 
in Table 4 provide information for a better understanding of the South African 
results. First, the means for the four South African parties on the left-right 
continuum show that all four of them are left-of-center parties. Therefore, the 
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distinction between Left and Right is less relevant in the South African party 
system. This is also confirmed by the much higher standard deviations in the 
ratings of their party’s ideological position within the South African parliamen-
tary parties. The results reveal considerable differences between the MPs of the 
ANC and those of the other three parties with respect to their perceptions of the 
economic crisis. The three smaller parties are much less optimistic in this re-
spect. This indicates that wishful thinking predominates among the MPs of the 
ANC and overrides the normal pattern of left-wing skepticism vis-à-vis a free 
market economy. 
Figure 3:  MPs’ Perceptions of the Economic Situation in the Four Countries 
with Bilateral Opposition 
 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. Mean index scores, range 0-1. 
 
Multiple regression analyses could be performed only for the four countries in 
which government participation and party ideology were sufficiently distinct 
variables. In the joint analysis of all four countries, only the influence of gov-
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ernment participation has a significant effect on the perceived situation of the 
national economy. The model explains 55% of the total variance and increases 
the likelihood for a positive perception by .38. The country-by-country results 
are similar. Party ideology does not significantly influence the perceptions of 
the economic situation of the country in any of the four countries. Figure 3 
confirms that the opposition parties differ only marginally in their evaluations 
of the economic situation, regardless of their own economic policy preferences. 
4. Effects of the Economic Perceptions on Political 
Orientations 
The question of how much the legitimacy of political regimes depends on eco-
nomic success has been a central concern of political philosophers and social 
scientists for a long time. It is intuitively plausible that their economic well-
being is of utmost importance to citizens and determines their evaluations of 
government performance more than most other policies. Even though govern-
ments have only limited powers to stimulate economic growth and prosperity, 
they may severely damage the long-run economic prospects of nations by stifling 
economic productivity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Because of their com-
plexity and their only indirect effects on the economic behavior of individuals, 
however, the effects of economic and social policies on the overall perfor-
mance of a national economy are difficult to predict and therefore controver-
sial. This is especially true in times of economic crisis when it is unclear 
whether decisions to save failing banks, to provide subsidies to ailing industries, 
or to stimulate customer demand will only prolong existing structural problems 
rather than restore economic growth, while they adversely affect different 
social groups and may fuel political protest. 
The major advantage of a democratic constitution is that it allows to differen-
tiate between the performance of the current government and the democratic 
political system, thereby shielding the democratic institutions from being 
blamed for poor governmental policies. If the interplay among government and 
opposition works well, we should expect a considerable differential between 
the performance ratings of MPs of both party camps. Table 5 confirms this 
expectation. With the exception of Chile and Korea, the great majority of the 
MPs belonging to the parties in government rated the performance of their coun-
try’s government in fighting the crisis as competent, while the ratings of the 
MPs of the opposition parties were much lower. In Korea, not only the opposi-
tional MPs were dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the crisis, how-
ever, but even less than half of the MPs of the governing party believed that the 
government had performed well. Chile stands out with only minor differences 
between government and opposition parties. 
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Table 5:  Evaluations of the National Government’s Performance in Fighting 
the Economic Crisis 
Country Evaluation Government Opposition Total 
Chile 
poor 18.8 15.8 17.1 
neither 33.3 29.8 31.4 
competent 47.9 54.4 51.4 
Germany 
poor 3.4 65.4 32.4 
neither 5.1 21.2 12.6 
competent 91.5 13.5 55.0 
Korea 
poor 6.9 83.0 41.0 
neither 48.3 17.0 34.3 
competent 44.8 0.0 24.8 
Poland 
poor 1.4 80.3 42.2 
neither 7.0 9.2 8.2 
competent 91.5 10.5 49.7 
South Africa 
poor 2.0 43.2 14.7 
neither 14.1 34.1 20.3 
competent 83.8 22.7 65.0 
Sweden 
poor 0.0 41.8 21.3 
neither 0.0 41.8 21.3 
competent 100.0 16.4 57.4 
Turkey 
poor 1.1 61.3 25.8 
neither 0.0 32.3 13.2 
competent 98.9 6.5 60.9 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. Column percentages per country. 
 
What do our data say about other economic policy attitudes of the MPs in the 
seven countries? The assumption that the crisis was caused by neoliberal poli-
cies is fairly widespread. The overall mean is .63 and the country scores range 
from .49 (Sweden) to .73 (Chile). At the same time, conventional wisdom holds 
that parties of the right are more inclined to favor neoliberal economic policies 
than those of the left, even though some left-of-center parties such as the Blair 
government (1997-2007) in the UK and the Schröder government in Germany 
(1998-2005) pursued neoliberal policies after they came to power. This has to 
be understood as a concession to the neoliberal Zeitgeist prevailing during the 
two decades before the beginning of the recession rather than being caused by 
their participation in government.14 A relationship between party ideology and 
the perception that neoliberalism was responsible for the crisis can be found 
only in the three countries where the traditional class cleavage is strongly an-
                                                             
14  Blair came to power after a sweeping reform of Labour’s economic policy program and 
explicitly called the party “New Labour.” Likewise, Schröder was frequently called “the com-
rade of the bosses.” Both published the common memorandum “The Third Way” in 1999, 
emphasizing the necessity of pursuing a middle way between traditional pro welfare-statist 
economic policies and neoliberalism. Cf. Blair and Schröder 1999. 
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chored in the party system, in Chile, Germany, and Sweden. In the other coun-
tries, the differences between the MPs belonging to the two ideological camps 
are much smaller. In Korea and South Africa they are even negligible. 
Table 6:  Perceptions of How the Economic Crisis Has Affected the Income 
Distribution in the Country by Party Ideology  
 
Income Differences 
Party Ideology 
Center- 
left 
Center- 
right Total 
Chile 
unchanged 0.0 4.2 2.1 
somewhat larger 8.7 62.5 36.2 
much larger 91.3 33.3 61.7 
Germany 
unchanged 13.5 51.7 33.6 
somewhat larger 44.2 39.7 41.8 
much larger 42.3 8.6 24.5 
Korea 
unchanged 0.0 8.9 4.9 
somewhat larger 54.3 55.4 54.9 
much larger 45.7 35.7 40.2 
Poland 
unchanged 18.2 28.4 26.8 
somewhat larger 36.4 50.9 48.6 
much larger 45.5 20.7 24.6 
South Africa 
unchanged 23.5 12.5 20.9 
somewhat larger 41.2 50.0 43.3 
much larger 35.3 37.5 35.8 
Sweden 
unchanged 12.5 47.5 31.8 
somewhat larger 33.3 50.8 43.0 
much larger 54.2 1.7 25.2 
Turkey 
unchanged 2.2 53.5 37.7 
somewhat larger 28.9 33.7 32.2 
much larger 68.9 12.9 30.1 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. Column percentages per country and party group. 
 
Table 6 shows that more than 60% of the MPs in each of the countries – in 
South Africa even close to 80% and in Chile more than 90% – supported the 
statement that income differences had increased during the crisis. Overall, less 
than a fourth of the MPs claimed that the differences had not increased, while 
one third even believed that they had become much larger. This raises the ques-
tion whether such a violation of the principle of distributive justice has pro-
duced a decline in the satisfaction with the government and in the way it han-
dled the crisis. This question is especially pertinent since the perception of 
rising income differences coincides with the traditional class cleavage. Once 
again, the relative influence of government participation and party ideology on 
the perception of rising income disparities can only be determined for four of 
the seven countries in which the two variables do not coincide. Regression 
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analyses for all four countries as well as country-specific analyses show that 
both factors do indeed have some impact. While one could suspect that party 
ideology is the more important predictor of this perception, government partic-
ipation again turns out to be more important. The latter decreases the belief that 
income differences have increased due to the crisis by .31, while a rightist 
ideological position decreases it by only .05. This can be explained by the fact 
that some far-right parties such as the PiS in Poland, the Sweden Democrats, 
and the MHP in Turkey answered the question affirmatively. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the relationship between concerns about rising income ine-
quality and party ideology is curvilinear. The MPs of centrist parties tended to 
take more moderate positions, while the MPs of the more radical parties of the 
left and right tended to claim that economic inequality is on the rise. The data 
thus support the claim that economic crises provide a fertile ground for popu-
lists of both persuasions to project themselves as fighters against the disastrous 
effects of globalization and neoliberalism and as protectors of citizens who – so 
they claim – have been neglected by the centrist political parties. 
Changes in economic policy attitudes of the MPs can be studied by compar-
ing the results of the CMP 2013 survey with those of the previous survey of 
2007. The latter had included a number of general questions regarding econom-
ic policies that were again asked in 2013. While it is of course not possible to 
interpret such changes as direct effects of the economic crisis, they provide at 
least indirect evidence. Figure 4 shows the results for a question asking wheth-
er the respondents preferred more income equality over larger income differ-
ences as incentives for individual effort. This question taps the socio-political 
class cleavage between left and right which is quite pronounced in Chile, Ger-
many, Korea, Sweden, and Turkey, but much less so in Poland and South Afri-
ca. This does not imply that there are no labor conflicts in the latter two coun-
tries, but rather that they are not rooted in their party systems. The typical 
pattern of a socio-political cleavage would require that the two major parties 
have close affiliations with either organized business or organized labor. In 
Poland, class is less relevant for inter-party conflicts than religiosity and the 
emphasis on Poland’s national interest. Neither of the two major parties, PiS 
and PLO, have a distinctive economic pro-labor or pro-business profile. In 
South Africa, socio-economic disparities and race used to be closely interrelat-
ed since there was no black middle class under Apartheid. Therefore, race was 
the central socio-political cleavage. Even though intra-racial differences have 
increased considerably since democratization and occupation has become more 
politically salient, race continues to be the most important determinant of vot-
ing behavior for the time being (Seekings and Nattrass 2005; García Rivero 
2006, 2014; Mattes 2014). 
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Figure 4:  MPs' Support for ‘Incomes Should Be More Equal’ 2007 and 2013  
 
Source: TRI 2007 and CMP 2013 Surveys. Mean score, range 0-1. 
 
The changes between 2007 and 2013 reveal a differentiated pattern. In Chile, 
the distance between parties of the left and right has somewhat narrowed be-
cause support for more income equality decreased by .11 among the center-left 
parties, while it remained stable among the center-right parties. In Germany, 
support increased in both party groups. At the same time, the distance between 
them remained about the same. In Korea, support increased significantly 
among the MPs of the liberal and somewhat among the MPs of the conserva-
tive party, thereby increasing the distance between the two political camps 
from .20 to .29. The results for Poland indicate stability. In South Africa, the 
support increased among the MPs of the center-left parties, while support 
among those of the center-right parties remained stable. Polarization is highest 
and at the same time rather stable in Sweden, where the left-of-center parties 
show very high support for more income equality and the right-of-center par-
ties very little. In Turkey, support for more equal incomes increased considera-
bly among the MPs of both party groups. At the same time, the two party 
camps are somewhat less polarized in Turkey than in Germany or Sweden. 
Thus, the pattern does not indicate a uniform trend toward more support for 
income equality, but rather a high degree of stability in six of the seven coun-
tries. 
Both surveys also included an item battery asking respondents to rate the 
degree to which they considered a number of fundamental political principles 
and economic policies to be essential characteristics of democracy on a ten-
point scale, among them respect for human dignity, protection of minorities, 
and unemployment benefits. A principal components analysis of these items 
revealed a two-dimensional structure. Five items dealing with an active eco-
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nomic role of government showed high factor loadings on one factor and a 
good scalability (Cronbach’s α = .83). The index is based on an affirmative 
answer for the following items: 
- Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 
- People receive state aid for unemployment 
- The economy is prospering 
- Basic necessities like shelter, food, and water for everyone 
- Jobs for everyone 
These items were combined to an index “Active economic role of government” 
with a range from 0 to 1. The index scores indicate broad support for social 
welfare policies in all countries with the exception of Poland (only in 2007) 
and Sweden. Since it can be assumed that support for welfare policies is higher 
among parties of the left, the means in Figure 5 are again broken down by the 
dichotomized party ideology variable. While the differences go into the ex-
pected direction, the polarization between the MPs of the left and the right is 
considerably lower than for the question on income equality. The scores show a 
high degree of stability over time, indicating that these items tap a basic politi-
cal orientation. 
Figure 5:  MPs' Support for an Economically Active Role of Government 2007 
and 2013 
 
Source: TRI 2007 and CMP 2013 Surveys. Mean index scores, range 0-1. 
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5. Changes in Democratic Legitimacy among MPs and 
Citizens 
Legitimacy theories distinguish between different objects of legitimacy as well 
as different types of political support, specific or diffuse (Easton 1965; Fuchs 
and Klingemann 2009). The distinction between support for authorities, for the 
existing institutional structure, and for the political regime, provides a theoreti-
cal basis to study the impact of the current economic crisis (Fuchs 2007). This 
distinction involves a hierarchy of objects of political support. At the lowest 
level, the electoral mechanism allows voters to withdraw electoral support if 
they are dissatisfied with the performance of their government. This mecha-
nism is designed to shield democracies from a loss of legitimacy in situations 
of perceived deficits in government performance. 
Economic crises that involve a decline in standards of living may have ad-
verse effects on political support, especially if a crisis persists and government 
policies to cope with it turn out to be ineffective. While dissatisfaction with the 
economic situation can be expected to first affect specific support for the cur-
rent government, in the long run such economic dissatisfaction may spill over 
and lead to an erosion of diffuse support. This is especially true for new de-
mocracies where these democratic institutions are not consolidated yet. There-
fore, Lipset (1959) argued that long-standing democracies with a history of 
well-functioning democratic institutions and a satisfactory level of economic 
security are better able to withstand economic crises than young democracies 
that have not had a chance to prove their political and economic effectiveness. 
This raises the question whether the third-wave democracies have already 
achieved a sufficiently high degree of consolidation and a broad enough sup-
port for their democratic institutions to prevent anti-democratic movements 
from successfully mobilizing dissatisfaction with hardships resulting from an 
economic crisis by blaming them on the malfunctioning of the democratic 
institutions. Therefore, it can be assumed that the new democracies in our 
group of countries are more vulnerable than the two established democracies 
Sweden and Germany, where the mobilization efforts of explicitly anti-
democratic movements do not find similarly fertile ground. 
Four indicators of legitimacy were included in the MP surveys of 2007 and 
2013. The question asking for the national government’s performance in deal-
ing with the economic crisis can be interpreted as indicator of specific support 
for the present government. A second question asked respondents to rate how 
democratically their country was presently governed. A third indicator is confi-
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dence in the political institutions and political parties of the country.15 Both of 
the latter indicators capture evaluations of the institutional structure of the 
country. The fourth indicator, finally, is a dummy variable measuring support 
for democracy. Among the MPs surveyed in 2013, the correlation coefficients 
between the perceptions of the economic situation and indicators of political 
legitimacy provide a first indication if the data show the assumed effects of 
economic distress also in the present crisis. While a positive perception of the 
economic situation is associated with a positive evaluation of government 
performance (r = .67), with trust in political institutions (r = .52) and satisfac-
tion with the current performance of democracy in the country (r = .52), it is 
not related to support for democracy (r = -.01). 
With the exception of the question asking for the evaluation of government 
performance, these indicators were also included in the 5th and the 6th wave of 
the World Values Survey. Figure 6 shows that – with the exception of Poland, 
South Africa, and Turkey – confidence in political institutions is very high 
among the MPs, while it is between .20 to .30 lower among the citizens.16 This 
is not really surprising since the MPs are involved in running these institutions. 
The results also indicate a high degree of temporal stability. It can be conclud-
ed that confidence in political institutions has not suffered much in the wake of 
the economic recession. The lower scores of the citizens do not necessarily 
imply a lower level of democratic legitimacy. They rather should be seen as 
resulting from the different political role of citizens most of whom are not 
actively involved in policy-making, but who have the constitutional right to 
vote governments out of office if they have failed to deliver satisfactory politi-
cal outputs. This conclusion is supported by the fact that citizen confidence in 
political institutions is only slightly higher in the two benchmark democracies 
Sweden and Germany. Furthermore, the evaluations of the MPs of opposition 
parties are markedly lower and much closer to those of the citizens than those 
of the MPs of governing parties (not shown). Therefore, low scores for confi-
dence in political institutions do not necessarily indicate a lack in legitimacy, 
but should be interpreted as a certain political vigilance on the side of the oppo-
sition parties, the citizens, and also the media, which is after all a precondition 
for the proper functioning of democracy. The results for the evaluation of the 
degree of democraticness of one’s own country are rather similar to those for 
                                                             
15  This index is based on the mean evaluations of four political institutions (government, 
parliament, civil service, and police) as well as political parties. The evaluations were meas-
ured on a four-point scale and the index scores were rescaled to a range from 0 to 1. 
16  One could suspect that these low confidence ratings are mainly due to the inclusion of 
political parties in the index. But while confidence in parliament is indeed about 10 percent 
higher than confidence in political parties, the exclusion of the latter would not have 
changed the picture substantially. 
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confidence in political institutions, although the means are somewhat higher for 
the latter question. 
Figure 6:  Confidence in Political Institutions among MPs and Citizens  
 
Source: TRI 2007 and CMP 2013 Surveys; World Values Survey waves 5 and 6. Index: Mean 
confidence ratings for parliament, government, public service, police, and political parties on a 
4-point scale, range 0-1. 
 
All four surveys included a question asking respondents to rate three types of 
political systems on a four-point scale as very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or 
very bad: 
- “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections” 
- “Having the army rule” 
- “Having a democratic political system.” 
The average ratings for democracy by the MPs were above .90 in five of the 
seven countries with the exception of Poland (.85) and Korea (.87). Those of 
the citizens were slightly lower in Chile, German, Sweden, and Turkey with 
averages between .80 and .90, but considerably lower and only slightly above 
.65 in the other three countries. Diamond (2008, 31-4) has questioned the valid-
ity of this item as an indicator of support for democracy. He argued that these 
ratings simply show that the term democracy tends to evoke positive associa-
tions even among respondents who do not understand its institutional implica-
tions. Diamond’s verdict is supported by the fact that the ratings for an auto-
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sense to create a more demanding indicator of support for democracy. There-
fore, a dichotomous index was constructed by subtracting the higher score for 
either an autocratic or a military regime from the score for democracy. Positive 
values indicate that democracy received a higher value than its two non-
democratic alternatives, negative or zero values indicate that this is not the 
case. 
Figure 7 shows that support for democracy was near universal and also sta-
ble over both waves of the survey among the MPs of all seven countries. At the 
same time, however, democracy achieved similarly high levels of support only 
among citizens in Sweden and Germany, with a slight decline between 2007 
and 2013. Citizen support for democracy was considerably lower in Chile and 
Poland, where it ranged from 60 to 70 percent. It reached finally only 50% in 
Turkey and was even lower in Korea and South Africa. The low levels of sup-
port among citizens in the latter three countries indicate that many citizens of 
these countries do not really care if they live under a democratic or an authori-
tarian regime as long as the government produces satisfactory outputs. This 
makes these democracies more vulnerable to economic downturns and political 
crises. 
Figure 7: Support for Democracy among MPs and Citizens 
 
Source: TRI 2007 and CMP 2013 Surveys; World Values Survey waves 5 and 6. 
Dichotomous index of evaluation of democracy minus evaluation of autocratic or military regime. 
 
Citizen support for democracy has not declined since the mid-2000s in six of 
the seven countries, however. South Africa is the great exception. Here, sup-
port for democracy plummeted from 58% in 2006 to 27% in 2013. In 2013, 
only 72% of the South African respondents still believed that democracy was a 
88%
100%
93%
87%
98% 100%
86%
68%
88%
45%
63%
58%
88%
50%
98% 100% 95% 95% 94% 96% 94%
69%
84%
46%
66%
27%
82%
50%
Chile Germany Korea Poland South Africa Sweden Turkey
MPs 2007
Citizens 2007
MPs 2013
Citizens 2013
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  198 
good thing, while at the same time 60% found the idea of having an autocratic 
ruler appealing.17 This was the deepest drop in support for democracy among 
nine fragile democracies included in these two waves of the World Values 
Survey (Hoffmann-Lange 2015, 74). While it may of course indicate an only 
temporary dissatisfaction due to the dismal performance of the South African 
government, it confirms that democratic consolidation has suffered a consider-
able setback and that the stability of today’s South African democracy depends 
primarily on the presence of a strong elite consensus. The fact that citizen sup-
port for democracy has remained more or less stable in the other four new 
democracies of our sample, confirms that democratic consolidation of these 
countries has not suffered in the wake of the recession, but that it has also not 
made any significant progress in recent years. 
6.  Conclusions 
The main result of the foregoing analysis is that the MPs’ economic percep-
tions have had little impact on their political orientations. The perceptions of 
the current economic situation differ considerably between members of the 
parties in government and of the opposition parties. Members of the governing 
parties perceived the economic situation of their country more positively than 
those of the opposition parties. Compared to government participation, party 
ideology (right vs. left) shows an only minor effect on the perceptions of the 
country’s economic situation. Party ideology plays a more important role for 
the perception of rising income inequalities, though, and contributes to intensi-
fying the traditional cleavage over economic policies. 
The data on political legitimacy show high levels of temporal stability and 
considerable differences between MPs and voters. The lower scores for confi-
dence in political institutions among citizens can be explained by the different 
roles of politicians and ordinary voters. The fact that support for democracy 
among citizens is significantly lower, finally, confirms the existence of an elite-
                                                             
17 It should be noted that Lekalage (2016) reports a much higher rejection rate for autocratic 
regime types in 2015 (80%). However the Afrobarometer survey used a different question 
wording. It asked if respondents were in favor of abolishing elections and parliament and 
letting the President decide everything instead. The broad rejection of this statement was 
probably caused by the widespread dissatisfaction with President Zuma rather than measur-
ing a general rejection of autocratic rule. Another Afrobarometer question asked if re-
spondents were willing to forego elections in favor of a non-elected government that 
would guarantee basic services such as safety, rule of law, housing, and jobs. The latter 
question was supported by 61% of the respondents. These results confirm that the wording 
of survey questions is of utmost importance. The second question is probably a better indi-
cator of regime preference than the first question that primarily measures confidence in the 
sitting president. 
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mass gap in political value orientations and attitudes that has regularly been 
found by political culture research (Hoffmann-Lange 2008). 
The MP-citizen differential found in support for democracy is much more 
pronounced in the five new democracies. While Chile and Poland have mean-
while reached levels of democratic support approaching those of consolidated 
democracies, citizen support for democracy is particularly low in Korea, Tur-
key, and South Africa. This implies that democracy in these three countries is 
more vulnerable when they have to cope with economic crises or have to ward 
off anti-democratic political movements. It seems questionable, however, 
whether the decline in support of democracy in South Africa can be attributed 
to the economic crisis. While the crisis may have aggravated the problems 
besetting South Africa, the decline in support of democracy can probably be 
primarily attributed to political factors (De Jager and Steenekamp 2019). Polit-
ical dissatisfaction has tremendously increased in the 2010s. It is based on a 
mixture of both political and economic concerns. Crime (95%), lack of em-
ployment opportunities (92%), government corruption (84%), and poverty 
(82%) were the foremost problems mentioned in a 2015 national poll (Pew 
Center 2016).  
The apparent erosion of credibility of some democratic and ‘legitimate’ insti-
tutions is essentially twofold. One, these institutions appear not to be run ef-
fectively – often undermined by poor governance, corruption and misman-
agement scandals. […] There appears to be a feeling that protective 
institutions such as the police and judiciary remain as hostile as they were for 
blacks under apartheid. (Gumede 2015, 334) 
It is noteworthy that the differences found between MPs of the governing and 
the opposition parties with respect to most of their economic evaluations and 
political orientations is higher in Turkey than in the other six democracies. 
Such a high degree of polarization at the elite level is likely to have negative 
effects on support for the existing democratic institutions among citizens, espe-
cially in the absence of a strong civic culture. Based on our data, it is therefore 
not surprising that the constitutional changes which dramatically increased the 
powers of the president and simultaneously weakened countervailing powers 
did not trigger widespread public protest. This decline in the quality of Tur-
key’s democracy (Berg-Schlosser and Hoffmann-Lange 2019) occurred in spite 
of the broad support for democracy expressed by Turkish MPs in 2013. It 
seems that the military coup attempt of July 2016 was responsible for a dra-
matic surge in support for strengthening governmental powers at the expense of 
civil rights among Turkish elites, even though the electoral majority in favor of 
the constitutional changes was rather slim. 
The marginal impact of the economic crisis on the political orientations in 
the seven democracies does not disconfirm the assumption that a prolonged 
economic crisis may increase the vulnerability of new democracies. First of all, 
none of the seven countries was severely hit by the crisis. In fact, all of them 
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had achieved a per capita income by 2013 that was higher than before 2008. 
Nevertheless, the fact that this crisis was less severe in the seven countries than 
in many others does not seriously diminish the validity of the study. The results 
suggest that the perceptions of the economic situation and the impact of the 
crisis did not mirror the actual situation. This implies that such perceptions take 
on a reality of their own and influence the world views and attitudes of people 
regardless of the actual impact of the crisis. 
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